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With stunning frequency, law makes us do things we do not want to do. It
taxes us even if we think taxation is excessive and its uses wasteful. It demands
that we adhere to speed limits when road conditions permit faster driving. It
bars us from activities we may believe benign or beneficial, such as buying
wine on Sunday or assisting a terminally ill friend who wishes to end her life.
And at times it conscripts us into military service, though we may believe the
wars immoral, the dangers exaggerated, or the enemies imagined. To be sure,
law's demands sometimes track what we would do even were there no law on
the subject. Quite often, however, laws coerce us into taking actions that, but
for the law, we would have avoided. Because the law can send us to prison,
extract fines, and compel us to pay those who sue us, it has ample means to
force us to do what we do not wish to do and even what we may believe it is
wrong to do.
To observe that law is commonly coercive is hardly a revelation, and even
less so to those whose goals are far from noble. In criminal circles, after all, "the
law" is slang for the police; for criminals know even better than the rest of us
that law is the force that can send them to prison for engaging in larceny,
assault, and countless other illegal acts. For bad people as well as good,
therefore, law's coerciveness looms large. And thus to the typical citizen,
attempting to understand and explain law without regard to its force would
seem scarcely conceivable.
Yet however unimaginable it may be to most people to contemplate law
without considering its power of compulsion, much of the modern analytic
jurisprudential tradition does just that. Historically, theorists such as Jeremy
Bentham' and, especially, John Austin2 saw law's ability to back its commands
with force as central to the concept of law and went so far as to define legal
obligation and duty in terms of the threat of sanctions for noncompliance with
the state's orders.' But although the Austinian picture of law dominated
jurisprudence from Austin's time until the mid-twentieth century, H.L.A.
Hart's 1961 attack in The Concept ofLaw on the view that coercion was essential
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL 1, 133-48, 196-98 (H.L.A. Hart ed., Athlone Press
1970) (completed 1782, first published posthumously 1945).
2. 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 311-20,
357-64 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Murray, 5th ed. 1885) (1861) [hereinafter
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE]; JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 21-25 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) [hereinafter
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED].
3. See AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 89 ("Being liable to evil from you
if I comply not with a wish which you signify, I am bound or obliged by your command, or I
lie under a duty to obey it.").
588
120:58 6 2olo
THE BEST LAID PLANS
to legality' is now widely understood to have delivered a fatal blow.' In
pointing out that many laws were empowering rather than restrictive and that
legality could exist when citizens or officials internalized legal norms even
absent sanctions, Hart demonstrated the folly of maintaining that the threat of
force was a necessary component of law. Practitioners of legal philosophy' in
the modern analytic tradition-proud heirs to the Hartian legacy-have
accordingly sought to explain the nature of law without reference to coercion.8
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 20-48 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed.
1994) (1961).
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, HART's LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION 21-35 (1992)
(endorsing Hart's criticism of Austin with respect to sanctions); Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241,
244-46 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (noting that Hart's notion of the internal point of view
explains legal obligation without necessary reference to sanctions); Neil MacCormick, The
Concept of Law and The Concept of Law, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL
POSITIVISM 163, 172 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (including in an essay honoring Hart the
conclusion that the imperative model of law is inadequate); see also P.M.S. Hacker, Sanction
Theories of Duty, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 131, 160-69
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973) (suggesting that even Hart may have accepted more of a
sanction-based account of duty than is justified). For additional sources, see infra note 8.
Even earlier, Arthur Goodhart, Hart's predecessor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford,
pointed out that "[i]t is because a rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of coercion
may be attached to it: it is not obligatory because there is coercion." A.L. GOODHART,
ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 17 (1953). Similarly, Edwin Patterson preceded Hart in
identifying categories of laws that could not be considered imperative. EDWIN W.
PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 123 (1953).
6. HART, supra note 4, at 48 ("The theory of law as coercive orders meets at the outset with the
objection that there are varieties of law found in all systems which . . . do not fit this
description."); see also id. at 27-33 (arguing that power-conferring rules do not fit the model
of orders backed by threats); id. at 88-91 (maintaining that pressure and compulsion do not
explain the internal point of view).
7. Following contemporary academic usage, I do not distinguish "jurisprudence" from "legal
philosophy." That said, the widespread conflation of the two has the unfortunate
consequence of slighting the theoretical contributions to understanding the phenomenon of
law by those who are not philosophers and do not use philosophical methods. See Frederick
Schauer, Re(Taking) Hart, 119 HARv. L. REV. 852, 865-69 (20o6) (reviewing NICOLA LACEY,
A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004)). It might be
preferable to reserve "philosophy of law" for jurisprudence performed with philosophical
techniques and leave "jurisprudence" to include not only philosophy of law but also
theoretical efforts to explain the nature and operation of law that are not explicitly
philosophical. But it is probably too late in the day to suppose that such a distinction might
develop and so, having announced this caution, I will continue to follow the herd and treat
"jurisprudence" and "philosophy of law" as roughly synonymous.
S. Thus, we see Jules Coleman maintaining that "[j]urisprudence is the study, in part, of how
law purports to govern conduct. It is not the study of how law secures individual
compliance with the rights and duties it creates by its directives." JULES COLEMAN, THE
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For them, the essence of law exists in its capacity to give reasons, not in its
willingness to use force to secure compliance with its directives. Legal coercion
may be pervasive, but it is still widely considered incidental to the nature of law
and extraneous to the concept of law.' Yet, as I shall discuss, this conclusion is
largely the product of the prevailing methodological commitments of
contemporary jurisprudential inquiry. Proceeding from the premise that only
the essential features of law can distinguish it from other normative social
institutions, practitioners of contemporary jurisprudence have been largely
preoccupied with searching for such essential (or necessary) features. Features
of law that are empirically pervasive but not strictly essential consequently find
themselves relegated to a decidedly inferior position in the hierarchy of
theoretical importance.
The modern tradition of seeking to explain the nature of law in terms of
essential properties, and accordingly without reference to force, is well
exemplified in Scott Shapiro's Legality.'o In this important contribution to
analytic jurisprudence, Shapiro accepts the modern view that only the essential
properties of law can explain its nature and that the use (or threat) of force, not
being strictly essential, is thereby not a component of the idea of legality. But if
the essence of law is not about forcing people to do things they do not want to
do, then it must be about something else. And for Shapiro, this essence must
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 72 n. 12
(2001). And Leslie Green insists that neither a system of "'stark imperatives' that ... bosses
people around nor a price system that structures people's incentives while leaving them free
to act as they please" would qualify as a "system of law" at all. Leslie Green, Positivism and
the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (2008); see also D.N.
MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative Fallacy, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES), supra note 5, at loo, 100-01 (describing the failure to
distinguish the imperative from the normative as "one of the perennial and persistent
fallacies in legal philosophy"); Kevin Toh, An Argument Against the Social Fact Thesis (and
Some Additional Preliminary Steps Towards a New Conception of Legal Positivism), 27 LAW &
PHIL. 445, 457 (2008) (agreeing with Hart that law exists when at least some members of a
community treat laws as providing reasons for action). And in the posthumous postscript to
the 1994 edition of The Concept ofLaw, Hart explicitly denies that the point of law is to
justify state coercion. HART, supra note 4, at 248-50 (responding to Ronald Dworkin's
assertions in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 93 (1986)). For recent revisionist attempts
to reclaim the importance of sanctions and coercion in explaining law, see MATTHEW H.
KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIviSM: LAw WITHOUT TRIMMINGS 84-89 (1999);
Danny Priel, Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory ofLaw, 21 RATIO JURIS 404 (2oo8);
Frederick Schauer, Was Austin Right After All? On the Role ofSanctions in a Theory ofLaw, 23
RATIO JURIS 1 (2010); and Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal
Norms, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 1195 (2008).
9. See supra notes 6, 8.
10. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
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be a function of the purpose that law serves. Just what is law for? And why and
how did it develop in the first place? These are important questions, albeit not
necessarily or exclusively philosophical ones," to which the answers are by no
means obvious. After all, human beings interact with each other in myriad
ways, but most of them stand apart from the law. We build families, enter into
relationships, make friends, and often even cooperate with each other; but such
forms of human interaction-and there are many others-predate the law as
we know it. Yet even though human beings had many kinds of interactions
before they had law, at some point in history they felt it important to create
law. But why and how did this happen? Why did societies create law, if not to
coerce, and what made it possible for law to get started in the first place? What
allows legal systems to exist and persist? And how do we distinguish law from
the other institutions through which people manifest and further their
collective existence?
Shapiro's distinctive (at least within the jurisprudential literature")
answers to these questions reside in the idea of planning, or more particularly,
social planning. Humans are planning creatures, he argues, and when we
attempt to make plans socially, collectively, and cooperatively in order to serve
group aims, we discover that we cannot do so without the devices and
institutions that characterize law as a distinct form of social interaction." We
need not only rules but also institutions to determine who makes the rules,
who changes them, and who interprets them. These tasks, however,
presuppose that the people who perform them have the authority to do so, and
social planning for Shapiro thus explains not only law's purpose but also its
possibility. By being the precondition for law's emergence, planning is, for
Shapiro, essential for legality." His claim thus goes beyond the more modest
ones that law facilitates planning or that planning facilitates law. For Shapiro,
law simply is planning, albeit of a particular institutional kind.
n1. And possibly not even largely philosophical ones. Academic inquiry is ill-served by excess
disciplinary fragmentation, imperialism, or isolationism. Although many of the questions
Shapiro addresses are ones that could be (and have been) the concern of anthropologists,
sociologists, and economists (among others), philosophical analysis and even speculation
about them can assist in clarifying the issues and offering hypotheses amenable to more
systematic social science examination.
u. Shapiro admirably acknowledges his intellectual debt to the philosopher Michael Bratman,
SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 119-22, and to his colleague Robert Ellickson, id. at 161 n.6; see
also infra note 62. For Bratman's relevant work, see infra note 65. A closely related
perspective in development economics earned a Nobel Prize for Elinor Ostrom. See infra
note 66.
13. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 154-81.
14. Id. at 181-92.
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There is much to learn from Shapiro's planning theory of law, as I
elaborate below. At times, however, Shapiro's valuable insights into the goals
and operation of law appear imprisoned within a view of the jurisprudential
enterprise that compels him not only to search for a noncoercive essence to law,
but also to assume that the nature of law can be explained only in terms of
law's essential properties and necessary implications." If we understand these
methodological and disciplinary constraints - if we understand that in the
contemporary jurisprudential milieu force and coercion cannot be part of the
explanation for law because only law's essential properties are allowed to
explain the nature of law-then Shapiro's planning theory is an example of
modern analytic jurisprudence at its best. But it is not clear why these
constraints should define the jurisprudential enterprise or even why Shapiro
should accept them. Once Shapiro has helped us understand the relationship
between law and social planning, we find ourselves with a new tool to
appreciate the role of the features that law possesses overwhelmingly but not
necessarily. And arguably most prominent among these features is the
phenomenon of law's coerciveness. Perhaps ironically, therefore, the full value
of Shapiro's insights can be grasped only by freeing ourselves from the
constraints that Shapiro's own conception of jurisprudence imposes.
I. LEGALITY: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
As befits a work of serious philosophy, Legality proceeds systematically
from a problem or puzzle. The puzzle that attracts Shapiro's attention is that of
law's origins, both temporally and conceptually. Sometimes he calls it the
"'chicken-egg' problem,"'6 and sometimes the "Possibility Puzzle,"17 but the
basic idea is the same: If local legal authority (this statute, or this judge, or this
ruling) rests on higher legal authority, and higher legal authority rests on still
higher legal authority, then how does law and legal authority get started
initially (the temporal question)? And what grounds the highest legal authority
(the conceptual question)? It is all well and good to say that in the United
States, for example, congressional, executive, and judicial legal authority is
derived from and rests on the Constitution; but where does the Constitution
15. Id. at 8-io.
16. Id. at 39-40.
17. Id. at 42-50.
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get its authority?" That is the Possibility Puzzle in a nutshell, and it has
interested scholars of law for generations.
For the religiously motivated natural lawyer,'9 the Possibility Puzzle is no
puzzle at all. The solution is straightforward: God. From a natural law
perspective, and especially one informed by a religious view of the foundation
of law, the ultimate source of legal authority is the natural or God-given status
of law itself. But Shapiro claims to be a card-carrying legal positivist in good
standing,2 o and for him natural law solutions to the Possibility Puzzle are no
solutions at all.
The Possibility Puzzle provides the gateway to Shapiro's own solution -
the planning theory of law -and also allows him to devote the first third of the
book to an attractively presented, albeit conventional, tour of the positivist
jurisprudential tradition. He describes Bentham and Austin's neat solution to
the Possibility Puzzle-legal authority rests on habitual obedience to the
sovereign, which typically rests on the sovereign's use of brute force or the
threat thereof." But Shapiro then follows Hart in rejecting this solution
because of its inability to explain power-conferring rules (such as rules that
make it possible to create contracts, wills, corporations, and, of course, laws)
18. This particular question is discussed extensively (including by Shapiro and by this author)
in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth
Einar Himma eds., 2009). See also Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a
Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 148-56 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (arguing that the
ultimate grounding of the Constitution can be a source of constitutional amendments). For
a formal approach to the problem of the foundations of law, see PETER SUBER, THE PARADOX
OF SELF-AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF LOGIC, LAw, OMNIPOTENCE, AND CHANGE (1990).
ig. The phrase in the text is not redundant. Although God figures heavily in some natural law
theories, see, e.g., RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL
LAW IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD (2003), religion is entirely absent from others, see, e.g.,
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985);
Philip Soper, In Defense of Classical Natural Law in Legal Theory: Why Unjust Law Is No Law
at All, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 201 (2007), and plays a decidedly minor role in the
legal theories of even some theorists with strong personal religious commitments, see, e.g.,
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAw AND NATURAL RIGHTS 48-49 (1980) (distinguishing a theory of
natural law from questions about God's existence).
20. See Scott J. Shapiro, in LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: 5 QUESTIONS 209, 212 (Morten Ebbe Juul
Nielsen ed., 2007) ("As far as I can remember, I have been a confirmed, dyed-in-the-wool,
[] stark-raving-mad legal positivist."). Whether a confirmed dyed-in-the-wool legal
positivist could claim, as Shapiro does, that "the law is supposed to provide its subjects with
moral reasons to comply with its demands," SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 411 n.11, is an
interesting question within legal positivism, but I leave it to other scholars or other
occasions.
zi. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 51-78.
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and its failure to recognize what Hart calls the "puzzled man,"" the person
who, in contradistinction to Holmes's "bad man," 2 simply seeks guidance and
is thus disposed to follow the law qua law for reasons other than fear of
sanctions. 4 Shapiro also briefly considers Hans Kelsen's related approach to
the questions of legal possibility and legal coercion" and finds it wanting, at
least in terms of using sanctions26 to explain the possibility of law and the
phenomenon of legality.
Unfortunately, Shapiro reads Bentham, Austin, and Kelsen through
Hart's eyes. And in presenting what are largely Hart's criticisms,2" he is
saddled with Hart's uncharitable readings of all three, 2  readings that charge
them with ignoring issues that they, in fact, recognized and with overlooking
22. HART, supra note 4, at 39-40.
23. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1o HARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). Holmes's
designation of the bad man as "bad" is unfortunate because it is hardly true that all or even
most people who are interested in predicting the legal consequences of their actions are
"bad" in any sensible meaning of that word. For sympathetic and non-caricatured
explanations of Holmes's term, see William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 275 (1973); and William Twining, Other People's Power: The Bad Man and English
Positivism, 1897-1997, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 189 (1997).
24. SHAPIRO, supra note so, at 59-78.
25. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., Russell &
Russell 1961) (1945); HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY: A
TRANSLATION OF THE FIRST EDITION OF THE REINE RECHTSLEHRE OR PURE THEORY OF LAW
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992) (1934);
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1960).
26. See HANS KELSEN, The Law as a Specific Social Technique, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW,
AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE 231, 235-44 (1957).
27. SHAPIRO, supra note 1o, at 66-68.
28. Id. at 54-89.
29. The view that Hart was a flawed and uncharitable reader of the work of others is widely
shared, even among his strongest admirers. Neil MacCormick's appreciative study of Hart
criticizes him for his unfortunate "caricature" of Kelsen's views on legal power and
competence. See NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 103 (2d ed., 2008). Nicola Lacey's
sympathetic biography notes that Hart's friend and coauthor Tony Honor6 was often
frustrated by Hart's "irritatingly casual" reading of the work of others. See LACEY, supra note
7, at 301. And Hart's cartoonish misreading of the Legal Realists has been the subject of
widespread comment. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered,
in NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 59, 6o n.4 (2007); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 148-49, 255, 429 n.68 (1973); Frederick Schauer, Introduction to KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed., forthcoming 2011). Moreover,
even Hart himself admitted that his portrayal of Austin departed from Austin's text in
various ways, albeit for what Hart claimed were purposes of clearer presentation of the
central issues. HART, supra note 4, at 18.
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challenges to which they plainly, even if not always successfully, responded.3 o
Still, Shapiro's goal is hardly to rescue Bentham, Austin, or Kelsen from Hart's
deficiencies as a reader. His portrayal of the views and weaknesses of all three is
much the accepted position in contemporary jurisprudential circles, serving for
Shapiro chiefly to introduce Hart's own views, again presented lucidly and
engagingly."
Shapiro presents Hart's views sympathetically, but he argues that even
Hart did not solve the Possibility Puzzle." Shapiro sees this as a deficiency,
although Hart may not have agreed. Indeed, Hart likely did not see the
Possibility Puzzle as a problem at all." For Hart, the question of why or even
how the ultimate rule of recognition is internalized by officials is simply not
part of his account, for it is the very existence of that rule, for whatever reason,
that grounds legality. Hart explained legal validity in terms of rules of
recognition culminating in an ultimate rule of recognition,34 with the ultimate
3o. To give two examples, a central theme in Hart's critique of Austin is the neglect of
secondary rules -rules about rules. See HART, supra note 4, at 77-96. But Austin explicitly
recognized laws about other laws (he called them "declaratory laws, or declaratory
statutes"), concluding that they constituted "an exception" to the view that laws are a
species of commands. See AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, supra
note 2, at 31-32. Hart also criticized Austin's notion of sovereignty for being incapable of
dealing with legal limitations on sovereign power. See HART, supra note 4, at 66-76. But
Austin again directly addressed the issue (although perhaps not satisfactorily) in AusTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 358-59, which noted that wise governments
conform their own conduct to their own laws.
31. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 79-102.
32. Id. at 102-17.
33. Much of Shapiro's argument is situated within the problem of so-called legal normativity,
the attempt to explain how law can provide oughts -reasons for action -simply on the basis
of social facts. Id. But Hart did not intend to provide such a thick account of legal
obligation; he intended simply to try to explain how law could, for moral, prudential, or
other reasons external to law, provide such reasons. See COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 89-90
n.26 (arguing that explaining the language of legal obligation is different from explaining
legal obligation itself). Nor is it obvious that a satisfactory account of the nature of law need
explain legal normativity in a coercion-independent way at all. See Frederick Schauer,
Positivism Through Thick and Thin, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 65
(Brian Bix ed., 1998); Frederick Schauer, Critical Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 495 (1994)
(reviewing ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT
(1992)).
34. It is a common misreading of Hart to equate the very idea of a rule of recognition with the
ultimate rule of recognition, but the two are different. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 5§ 551-559 (2oo6), for example, is in part a rule of recognition establishing
the conditions for the legal validity of federal administrative regulations. That is, a federal
administrative regulation is valid only if "recognized" as such by the rules of recognition in
the APA. The validity of the APA is in turn determined by the Constitution, which functions
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rule (and its acceptance) lying outside the realm of legal validity simply as a
matter of social fact." Thus Hart had no need to consider, let alone solve, the
Possibility Puzzle. His focus on the facticity of social practices and on the social
(and official) acceptance of the rule of recognition is unconcerned with why an
ultimate rule of recognition would have been created (or have emerged) and
why the ultimate rule of recognition should be accepted at all, whether by
citizens, officials, or anyone else. These are the questions that Shapiro's
planning theory is primarily designed to answer, although it is a mistake to
think that they were Hart's questions. Still, if we are concerned with the
origins of legality as well as its raw status, we should be more interested than
Hart was in why a society or its officials would accept an ultimate rule of
recognition and why it would accept this rule rather than some other. In
addressing these questions, Shapiro, to his credit, steps away from what Hart
thought was most important about law.
Shapiro's planning theory is thus less a supplement or correction to Hart's
theory than an attempt to address a different and important problem. The
value of Shapiro's notion of law as social planning, which occupies the middle
third and most important part of the book"6 and which I sketch in the ensuing
Part, is hence, pace Shapiro, not dependent on its location within the positivist
dialectic as he describes it. It has its own considerable value even outside the
positivist canon.
The basic idea is straightforward. Acknowledging his debt to the
philosopher Michael Bratman," Shapiro focuses on planning as a fundamental
and characteristic human activity. We are planning creatures, he insists, which
means that we not only take particular actions at particular times for particular
purposes but also decide in advance on courses of action more simply called
"plans." " And in addition to making plans for ourselves, we engage in
planning as a collective or social activity, coordinating our plans with the plans
of others to produce group plans - Shapiro's preferred term is "social
planning," although he acknowledges that, thanks to Stalin, Mao, and others,
as another rule of recognition. But the ultimate rule of recognition is that which determines
that the Constitution of the United States, rather than the Constitution of France or a
constitution I might write myself, shall determine the validity of acts of Congress. See
Schauer, supra note 18.
35. See HART, supra note 4, at 107-10.
36. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 118-233.
37. See supra note 12; infra note 65 and accompanying text.
38. Bratman sees a close relationship between planning and what it is to have an intention. See
Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance, 119 ETHICS 411
(2009).
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the term has come to us with something of a bad odor" - that enable groups to
pursue collective goals that individuals could not pursue on their own.
Plans are important, especially for the legal philosopher, because they are
both committing and constraining. They are, of course, not absolutely
committing or constraining, but by being reason-giving they do commit and
constrain future actions. If I plan now to go out to dinner tomorrow, not only
does that plan give me a (nonconclusive) reason to go out to dinner tomorrow
that I would not otherwise have had, but it also provides a (nonconclusive)
reason that I would not otherwise have had not to do anything conflicting at
that time. In providing content-independent reasons for action,40 plans are
intimately connected with the content-independent notion of legal authority
itself.4 '
Shapiro's social planning approach to law derives much of its value from
the way in which social planning necessitates the secondary rules4 - the rules
about rules - that are characteristic of law. There is of course a vast literature
on coordination and cooperation," and we now understand why and how
39. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 154. Of course, there have also been more or less successful
instances of social planning, such as the New Deal and the modern welfare states of
Northern and Western Europe.
40. On content-independence -the notion of a reason emanating from the source of a
prescription and not its content -see especially H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative
Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243, 262-66
(1982). For subsequent explication and development, see R.A. Duff, Inclusion and Exclusion:
Citizens, Subjects and Outlaws, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 241, 247 (1998); Kenneth Einar
Himma, H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis, 6 LEGAL THEORY 1, 26-27 (2000);
Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935-40 (20o8); and
Frederick Schauer, The Questions ofAuthority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95 (1992). For a skeptical view of
the notion of content-independence, see P. Markwick, Independent of Content, 9 LEGAL
THEORY 43 (2003).
41. Joseph Raz, more than anyone, has helped us understand the nature of legal authority,
although Raz's view that law necessarily claims to be authoritative is different from the view
that law necessarily is authoritative. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW]; JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975); see also P.S. Atiyah, Form and Substance in Legal
Reasoning: The Case of Contract, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORE 19 (Neil
MacCormick & Peter Birks eds., 1986); Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 382 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002); Robert S. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1978).
42. HART, supra note 4, at 77-96.
43. The seminal work, at least with respect to politics and social policy, is THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960), followed by numerous others, perhaps
most prominently DAVID K. LEwiS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
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people come to create and agree on shared norms of behavior.4 But it is one
thing to have a norm that everyone will drive on the right side of the road and
not on the left, to take a common example, and something else again to have a
collective (or social) plan about having rules of the road in general. When we
decide to adopt the latter, the social planning for a regime of rules of the road
becomes more complex than a one-off decision that people will drive on the
right. The social planning involved in creating the institution of rules of the
road requires that there be people or institutions authorized to decide what the
rules of the road will be, to determine who shall have the power to change
those rules, to designate who is authorized to interpret the rules in cases of
indeterminacy of application, and to settle the question of who shall settle
disputes about those applications. In other words, it is social plans, and not
just collective norms, that explain what Hart described as the essence of law-
the union of primary rules with secondary rules of recognition, change, and
adjudication."
In developing his claim that legal activity is a form of social planning,
Shapiro uses a series of engaging stories about a fictional Cooking Club, whose
members end up on the previously uninhabited Cooks Island in the South
Pacific and seek to govern themselves.46 Through the use of these stories,
Shapiro demonstrates not only that collective goals would naturally require the
development of the institutions we think of as essential components of a legal
system," but also that such institutions would be needed and could function
even absent sanctions. People of good will engaged in a common enterprise
with no desire to depart from the goals of that enterprise might not need to be
coerced into following the rules of the enterprise but would still need
hierarchies, authorities, rules of recognition, rules of change, and rules of
adjudication. In other words, there would be a "point" to law, and there would
Schelling in turn builds on an earlier tradition of game theory commonly attributed to John
von Neumann. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONoMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). For a useful and accessible introduction, see DOUGLAs G.
BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
44. See, e.g., EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977) (analyzing how
rules and norms emerge among groups).
45. See HART, supra note 4, at 95-96.
46. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 129-86.
47. Shapiro is vague about whether and when social planning necessarily requires the
development of law or law-like regimes of primary and secondary rules, an issue that will
become important in Part IV. But it is worth mentioning here that the modest and correct
claims that law facilitates social planning and that social planning explains the development
of law are different from Shapiro's stronger claims that law is social planning and that social
planning is an essential property of legality.
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be law, even in a community of people of trust and good will who had no call
to apply sanctions to the behavior of others. For Shapiro, law is thus the
solution not to the problem of disobedience or bad faith or selfish behavior;4' it
is the solution to the problem of moral disagreement -a problem that can exist
even among people of good faith, trust, and a shared view of the higher-order
goals of the society they constitute and inhabit."
Shapiro's positivist view of law extends to social planning as well. Bad
plans still count as plans, and both bad and good plans can generate the
structure of hierarchy, authority, and institutional complexity that is essential
to law. That there is no moral component in the definition of a plan is
especially important to Shapiro because he sees the particular form of social
planning that is law as a response not to disagreement in general, but to moral
disagreement in particular. And law can manage moral disagreement only if its
authority, or at least its claim to authority, is independent of the moral value of
the directives it issues.
48. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 173-75.
49. That law is driven by the problem of moral disagreement is a proposition to which I
wholeheartedly subscribe. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law's Limited Domain
Confronts Morality's Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579 (2007); see also Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, n1o HARv. L.
REV. 1359, 1375-77 (1997) (viewing constitutions as solutions to problems of moral
disagreement). For further discussion, see the authorities cited in note 74, infra. Moral
disagreement is important for Shapiro not only to explain the circumstances of law's
emergence but also to differentiate law from other social planning enterprises. See SHAPIRO,
supra note so, at 209-24. We can imagine, for example, that a football team, whose shared
goal is to win games by scoring more points than its opponents, or the Mafia, whose
members share a goal of maximizing power and profit, will need to develop systems of
primary and secondary rules in order to effectuate the social plan. But such systems are not
law, argues Shapiro, because they are not designed to deal with the specific problem of
disagreement in the context of a morally motivated (which is not the same as morally
correct) master plan. In seeking to distinguish the law of Kansas from the law of the Mafia,
Shapiro takes on a problem that has long been central to legal theory, but it is not entirely
clear why explaining the distinction is so important. Although issues of sovereignty,
territoriality, Shapiro's moral goals, and the monopoly on the use of legitimate force are all
candidates for distinguishing the law of the state from the law of a nonstate organization,
the similarities between the legal system of New Jersey and the "legal" system of the
American Contract Bridge League may be as interesting and important as the differences.
Moreover, although Shapiro's use of moral motivation to distinguish legal from nonlegal
institutions allows the law of erroneously morally motivated states-Nazi Germany,
apartheid South Africa, and Stalinist Russia, for example to count as law, it also leads to
the counterintuitive conclusion that kleptocratic states whose dictators are interested only in
their own gain - the Philippines under Marcos, for example, or Zaire under Mobutu -do
not have law at all.
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Thus, legal positivism, especially the exclusive (or hard) version of it to
which Shapiro has been an influential contributor,"o plays a substantial role in
Shapiro's story. In the extensive discussion of legal positivism that follows his
argument for a planning theory of law," Shapiro argues that neither legal
positivism nor the social planning theory of law entails or even encourages
formalist adjudication. The conception of formalism that is Shapiro's foil
might well be contested," but that question is best left for another time. For
5o. For examples of Shapiro's contributions to the exclusive positivist corpus, see Scott J.
Shapiro, The Diference That Rules Make, in ANALYZING LAW: NEw ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY
33, 56-59 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT:
ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAw 149 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001)
[hereinafter HART'S POSTSCRIPT]; and Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of
Conduct, 6 LEGAL THEORY 127 (2000). Exclusive positivism, which holds that a moral test
necessarily cannot be part of the rule of recognition (as opposed to incorporationism or
inclusive positivism or soft positivism, which holds that a moral test is not necessarily part
of a rule of recognition, see COLEMAN, supra note 8; W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL
POSITIVISM (1994); Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 41, at 125), is also
represented by, inter alia, RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw, supra note 41, at 37-53; JOSEPH RAZ,
ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 185-253 (rev.
ed. 2001); Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis,
in HART'S POSTSCRIPT, supra, at 355; and Andrei Marmor, Exclusive Legal Positivism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 41, at 104.
Si. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 234-81.
52. For Shapiro, formalism claims the completeness of law -its ability to resolve all the disputes
that come before it. But except for the subtle and complex version that Ronald Dworkin
advances, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (20o6) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE IN ROBES]; DWORKIN, supra note 8; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977), and which Shapiro argues against (calling it "rump formalism"), see SHAPIRO, supra
note lo, at 259-306, the formalism to which Shapiro objects and which he claims is not
entailed by legal positivism seems largely a strawman. Even Joseph Beale and Christopher
Columbus Langdell did not hold the views about the completeness of law that are
commonly attributed to them (in, for example, Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 6, 29 n.103 (1983)). See, e.g., Joseph Beale, The Development ofjurisprudence
During the Past Century, 18 HARV. L. REV. 271 (1904) (recognizing that Bentham's and
Napoleon's aspirations of codified completeness were inconsistent with reality and with
what science tells us about how law operates). For a revisionist history of formalism, see
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING (2010), which argues that most characterizations of the so-called formalist age of
the nineteenth century are inaccurate. However, Tamanaha appears to misstate the extent to
which a variety of formalism did occupy a significant place in nineteenth and
early-twentieth-century legal thought. See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism:
What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010). If we understand formalism, more
plausibly, as a claim about the possibility of legal constraint by rules and not about the
desirability or completeness of rule-based decisionmaking, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism,
6oo
120:58 6 2010
THE BEST LAID PLANS
now, we can accept his understanding of formalism as the view that law is
complete in itself, that there are no legally-unprovided-for cases (gaps in the
law), and that moral considerations have no place in adjudication. Using this
definition, Shapiro argues that formalist adjudication does not follow from
legal positivism or from understanding law as social planning.
Turning from pure formalism to what he calls "rump formalism,"" Shapiro
then sets social planning largely aside, focusing on a defense of legal positivism
and charging positivism's most prominent opponent, Ronald Dworkin, with
misunderstanding positivism's core commitments. Followers of current
debates about positivism will find this material illuminating even though the
connections with social planning are somewhat elusive. And much the same is
true of Shapiro's application of these jurisprudential debates to some concrete
legal disputes, where the discussion of formalism and legal reasoning is linked
with a critique of the interpretive views of Justice Scalia and the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 4 among other issues both real and current.
The planning theory of law fades into the background in these discussions, but
Shapiro's jurisprudential treatments of these issues are illuminating even for
those less interested in abstract jurisprudence or unpersuaded by the planning
account of legality. The book concludes, however, with an explicit return to
law as social planning and to the connection between social planning and
questions of trust and distrust. So although some of Shapiro's digressions are
independently valuable, law as social planning dominates the book and
provides the focus for considering the totality of Shapiro's contributions to
legal thought.
II. LAW AS PLAN
Shapiro's Cooking Club and other fictional examplesss effectively
demonstrate what plans are, what they can do, and what institutional
consequences follow from adopting them.s When groups make plans to
97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988), then we can understand why planners might sometimes wish to use
the tool of formalism in order to make their plans more effective.
53. SHAPIRO, supra note so, at 259-3o6.
54. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
ss. These include the example of the Condo Board at Del Boca Vista, which he uses to
distinguish law from various nonlegal forms of social planning. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at
217-22.
s6. It is curious that Shapiro alleges that legal philosophy has demonstrated a "lack of interest"
in the "institutional" side of law and the "institutional structures" that are part of it.
SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 6. Lon Fuller would have found the claim surprising, see, e.g.,
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pursue common goals, they develop a need, as time goes on and as the groups
grow, for hierarchies, authority figures, rules that determine who shall make
and change the rules, and rules that help in interpreting the rules and
determining who shall interpret them.
These are the rules that Hart called secondary rules. They are rules about
rules, and they characterize law. Moreover, Shapiro's account of the bottom-up
development of secondary rules distinguishes the social planning story from
many of the more familiar stories about the development of norms under
circumstances of group cooperation and coordination." Scholars such as
Thomas Schelling in economics,'" Robert Axelrod in political science, 9 David
Lewiso and Edna Ullman-Margalit in philosophy,61 and Robert Ellickson in
law 6' have developed pervasive, influential, and discipline-changing accounts
LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER
(Kenneth 1. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001), as would Neil MacCormick, Dick Ruiter, Robert
Summers, William Twining, and many others. See, e.g., LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL NORMATIVE
ORDER (Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski eds., 2009); NEIL MACCORMICK,
INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY (2007); NEIL MACCORMICK & OTA
WEINBERGER, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW: NEW APPROACHES To LEGAL POSITIVISM
(1986); DICK W.P. RUITER, INSTITUTIONAL LEGAL FACTS: LEGAL POWERS AND THEIR
EFFECTS (1993); DICK W.P. RUITER, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (2001); ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL STUDY (20o6); WILLIAM TWINING,
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009).
57. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 195-201. Shapiro takes the bottom-up incrementalism
characteristic of the common law as preferable to codification and as virtually essential to
legal planning. Id. But that conclusion is odd. Increasingly, common law systems such as the
United States rely heavily on comprehensive statutes that do not simply encapsulate or
systematize existing law. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence ofRules and Standards, 2003
N.Z. L. REV. 303 (documenting this phenomenon). In the wake of recent and massive health
care and financial reform statutes, the claim that legal planning in the United States is
characteristically incremental or bottom-up seems very open to challenge.
58. SCHELLING, supra note 43.
s. ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF
COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984).
6o. LEWIS, supra note 43.
61. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, supra note 44-
62. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
Ellickson's analysis resembles Shapiro's (and Hart's) more than the arguably misleading
title of Ellickson's book would suggest. In explaining how a dispute resolution system arose
in Shasta County, California, Ellickson pinpoints the development of a dispute resolution
system with the primary and secondary rules he calls "constitutive" and "controller-
selecting" rules, id. at 134 n-33, thus identifying the development of something better
characterized as a parallel legal system than one that operates "without law." The same can
be said about Lisa Bernstein. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
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of the nonhierarchical development of norms; ' and we now have a better
understanding of how groups effectuate collective purposes through the
virtually spontaneous generation of group norms, even if no leader or hierarchy
exists.
Most of the literature on the development of norms, however, is about
primary and not secondary norms. It is about rules of behavior -rules about
driving on the left or the right remain the classic example -and rarely about
the rules about those rules. And if, as Hart maintained, the union of primary
and secondary rules is the move from a prelegal to a legal culture,6 4 then one
aspect of Shapiro's contribution is in connecting a literature largely about
primary rules with a literature, pioneered by Hart, that recognizes that a
collection of primary rules is not sufficient to constitute a legal system. By
showing how groups with common goals need the secondary rules that
characterize legality, Shapiro's social planning theory offers a powerful account
of what legality is and how it comes into being. Shapiro acknowledges Michael
Bratman in providing the more abstract philosophical foundations for this
account,6 and indeed Elinor Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in
economics for her analysis of the development of governance in previously
66 ete
ungoverned groups. But neither Ostrom's work nor Bratman's has much
penetrated the legal culture. Shapiro has thus made a substantial contribution
to legal thought in showing that the development of law is more than simply
the development of primary norms and in showing how and why groups
develop the secondary norms that enable legality itself.
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms,
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
63. Nonhierarchical in the sense of not being imposed from above by, say, a legislature, but not
in the sense of not incorporating an internal hierarchical structure.
64. HART, supra note 4, at 91 -99.
65. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (1987); Michael
E. Bratman, Intention, Belief and Instrumental Rationality, in REASONS FOR ACTION 13 (David
Sobel & Steven Wall eds., 2009); Michael Bratman, Intention and Means-End Reasoning, 90
PHIL. REV. 252 (1981); Michael E. Bratman, Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-
Governance, 119 ETHICS 411 (2009).
66. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION
SYSTEMS (1992); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, LARRY SCHROEDER &
SUSAN WYNNE, INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES IN PERSPECTIVE (1993); ELINOR OSTROM, Roy GARDNER & JAMES
WALKER, RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES (1994). For Ostrom's overview of
her own contributions, see Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance
ofComplex Economic Systems, loo Am. ECON. REV. 641 (2010).
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Few societies these days lack legal systems. Shapiro's hypothetical Cooking
Club and Cooks Island accordingly serve not as a representation of anything
close to an actual national legal system, but rather as a heuristic allowing him
to show that a society pervaded by trust and cooperation would still need social
plans and consequently a legal system. One of Shapiro's foils is thus James
Madison, who in The Federalist No. 51 famously observed that "[i] f men were
angels, no government would be necessary.",6 Not so, says Shapiro, for even a
community of angels, if it is to be a community at all, would need social plans,
and therefore secondary rules, and therefore law-or government. He insists
that law is not about bad people, or necessarily about distrust, but about the
way in which trusting and cooperating angels would still need to develop what
we now think of as a legal system in order to function as a community.
If James Madison is one of Shapiro's foils, however, then Bentham and
Austin must be foils as well. A community of trusting angels-or trusting
cooks68 -would still need law, Shapiro argues, but would not need coercion.
These good and trusting people would develop a legal system but would have
no call to develop sanctions, institutions of organized force, or other forms of
coercion. The trusting angels - the community of Hart's puzzled men - would
have law but might well not have police, prisons, fines, or sanctions of any
kind. Contrary to what Bentham, Austin, and perhaps Holmes believed,
Shapiro demonstrates that there can be law without force and law without
sanctions. Whatever the ubiquity of coercion in actual legal systems, therefore,
it would be error to take coercion as essential to the nature of law or the
definition of legality.
III.WHEN PLANS GO AWRY
Shapiro joins Hart and others in showing that Austin's sanction-dependent
definitions of law and legal obligation are unsustainable, in large part because
important aspects of law are simply not coercive. For example, the legal rules
that empower private transactions, such as contracts and wills,69 do not compel
anyone to do anything, nor do the rules that constitute lawmaking itself.70
Moreover, the sanction story cannot explain how lawmakers themselves are
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
68. Who might be as rare as trusting angels. See Kate Schwartz, Pig Cook-Off Ends in Brawl,
Head-Butting by Chef NEWSER (May 19, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://www.newser.com/
story/89298/pig-cook-off-ends-in-brawl-head-butting-by-chef.html.
69. HART, supra note 4, at 26-48.
70. Id. at 8o-81.
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bound by the law, and Austin's account fits best with a system in which a
legally immune sovereign at the apex of a hierarchy gives orders to those
below."
Shapiro follows Hart in finding the Austinian account defective for failing
to explain so many dimensions of law, but he takes the analysis further. Hart,
and Shapiro in the early pages of Legality," grudgingly accept that Austin's
picture was substantially accurate for the rules of the criminal law (and perhaps
also for much of tort and regulatory administrative law)." The social planning
story, however, puts the lie even to this aspect of sanction theory. Shapiro's
cooks need not only power-conferring rules but also conduct rules from central
authority telling them how to act.7 In order for a community to function, its
members must know what to do and what not to do. But because the cooks are
trusting and inclined to obedience, the community does not need sanctions to
secure compliance with even the primary musts and must-nots. Shapiro has
thus shown, in ways that Hart did not, that coercion-free law is possible even
with respect to the primary behavior-constraining rules that members of a
community are expected to follow.
Yet it is surely not irrelevant that Shapiro's community of cooks is a make-
believe story. While the make-believe serves valuable heuristic purposes, we
know that all real legal systems employ sanctions." Communities of trusting
angels are conceptually possible, but the fact that no such communities exist
within the realm of governmental legal systems is more than just an interesting
but ancillary fact about the legal world. It is evidence, albeit not conclusive, of
the nature of the communities that are governed by the law of political states
and their subdivisions. And in the world of law as it exists and as it is
experienced, coercion is rampant and sanctions are omnipresent.
71. Hart raises the objection against Austin, see id. at 26, but it is a mistake to suppose that
Austin did not recognize the issue, see supra note 30.
72. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 59-60.
73. HART, supra note 4, at 27.
74. Shapiro's account of the function of law thus bears a close affinity to the settlement function
of law developed in LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAw 11-49 (2001). See also Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All
er Nuthin": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530 (1999).
75. In a brief endnote, Shapiro acknowledges that law "usually" supplements the moral reasons
it provides with sanctions. See SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 411 n.11. But in emphasizing that
"law need not impose sanctions as a matter of necessity," and in relegating the discussion of
sanctions to a brief and grudging note, Shapiro makes clear the subservient role that
sanctions play in his account of law. Id.
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One explanation for the pervasive presence of coercive legal systems goes
back to Madison and his observation about the nonangelic qualities of actual
humans76 or back even further to Hobbes and his notoriously pessimistic view
of human behavior in the state of nature." In the world that we know, angels
exist but are rare, and the self-interested agent misleadingly dubbed the "bad
man"' by Holmes is all around us. Because many people are inclined to press
their own interests even at the expense of others or of the common good, law
typically, even if not necessarily, seeks to guard collective welfare against the
self-serving behavior of non-public-spirited individuals. Real legal systems are
accordingly replete with fines, imprisonment, injunctions, damage awards, and
other forms of coercion. To be sure, law enables us to do things we could not
otherwise do, and power-conferring rules and institutions are a substantial part
of our legal world. But so are rewards" and punishments, and accounting for
the phenomenon of law while neglecting such incentives seems as incomplete
as Austin's account was in ignoring contracts, wills, and a legally constrained
sovereign.
The existence of coercion and other legally constituted incentives in real
legal systems should be understood less as an exception to Shapiro's social
planning account than as complementary to it, with the complementarity being
chiefly a function of the nonangelsso described above. Because social plans are
as important in the real world as in the fictional one of well-meaning cooks,
sanctions are often needed to make plans effective. Consider first the plans that
we make for ourselves, such as plans to lose weight or quit smoking. These are
not social plans. But they are still plans in Shapiro's sense, because the fact that
I plan to lose weight gives me a reason to lose weight beyond the (good)
reasons to lose weight that exist even absent the plan. But as is well known, we
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
77. Hobbes saw the state of nature as one in which people would live in "continual fear, and
danger of violent death." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1994) (1651).
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79. Austin's view of sanctions included punishment and explicitly excluded the promise of
rewards. See AuSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, supra note 2, at 24-25.
But the distinction is impossible to defend. Moreover, there is no reason to exclude
reputation-enhancing or -detracting measures from the realm of sanctions. As long as
reputations are important to people, actions affecting those reputations will have coercive
effects. See, e.g., Christopher Avery, Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, The Market for
Evaluations, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 564 (1999); Nicholas Emler, A Social Psychology of
Reputation, 1 EUR. REV. Soc. PsYCHot. 171 (1990).
8o. Madison's characterization in The Federalist No. 51 is enduring, but even he would not have
referred to those who were not angels as "devils."
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often need to make our plans effective by attaching some coercion to them."
We hire personal trainers to harangue us, we contrive elaborate systems to
reward and punish us, and in other ways we create sanctioning systems to
reflect the way in which planning by itself is often insufficient.
The need for sanctions applies as much to social plans as to individual ones.
Even apart from the free-riders and others whose selfish desires need to be
checked by the threat of sanctions, weakness of the will is also a social issue.
Indeed, the weakness-of-the-will problem becomes clearer as we fathom the
import of what it is for a social plan to provide a reason for action as a plan. At
the heart of Shapiro's planning account of law is the view that social plans have
authoritative status. A plan, once made, becomes a reason just because it is a
plan, and the reason-giving capacity of plans, like that of rules, precedents, and
legal authorities, is content-independent.8' But the content-independent power
of a social plan will make a difference principally when the individual who is
expected to follow it has a good content-based reason to do something other
than what the social plan demands. Plans have their bite not just because they
are reason-giving but also because they are reason-giving even in the face of
conflicting reasons for doing something other than what the plan requires.
Because plans are especially important when their addressees see good
reasons for doing something else, widespread compliance with social plans will
be systematically difficult. The whole point of planning, rather than just doing,
is that plans aim to produce action in the face of desires or reasons to do
something else. Once we see this systematic conflict between a plan and plan-
independent reasons, we can appreciate that supporting social plans with
organized coercion is not merely an epiphenomenal accessory. Sanctions are
directed not only at the occasional outlier uninterested in pursuing the public
good, as even public-minded members of a group (or society) will often have
views about the group's ends and means that diverge from the group's plans.
For a social plan to be effective, the members of society, absent sanctions, will
need to set aside not only their self-interested desires but also their own views
of what the group ought now to do for the group's benefits. But this
subjugation of individual views, required by the notion of planning, is
systematically unlikely to occur without the threat of force. Sanctions are
therefore a predictable necessity whose importance emerges once we see the
systematically frustrating dimension of social plans.
81. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357 (1985); see also
STICKK--CHANGE STARTs Now, http://www.stickk.com/login.php (last visited Sept. 4,
2010) (allowing users to sign contract obligations for self-improvement).
82. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 13-84 (2009).
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Coercion, even if not strictly necessary for legality as Shapiro conceives it, is
legality's natural ally. Madison's point about angels and government can be
modified to observe that if people were always inclined to do the right thing,
not only would rules be unnecessary but so would plans. Plans are a way of
recognizing the suboptimal tendencies of unplanned preferences. We need not
hold a dim Hobbesian view of human nature to understand that assisting social
plans with coercion is as understandable as assisting my desire for fitness by
hiring a personal trainer who not only will instruct me in how to maximize the
effectiveness of my workout, but also will, with my advance authorization,
hector me when the weakness of my immediate will threatens to overcome the
strength of my non-immediate plans.
Hart criticizes Austin for offering a theory that "failed to fit the facts,""' but
focusing on the bad rather than the puzzled man is an error only if puzzled
men exist in significant quantities. Shapiro takes the same tack, asserting that
"many" people are inclined to follow the law just because it is the law, even
when it conflicts with their antecedent and law-independent desires and
preferences. But these are empirical claims. We could, of course, dismiss
Hart's and Shapiro's empirical claims as off-hand remarks irrelevant to the
project of explaining law's reason-giving character."' The ability of law to
provide sanction-independent reasons for action for the properly motivated
agent would then not depend on the existence of many (or any) people who are
actually so motivated. But if Hart's and Shapiro's words are to be taken
seriously, and if descriptive accuracy is one measure of a successful theory of
law, then the soundness of an account of the nature of law as a social
institution depends, at least in part, on its empirical accuracy. The explanatory
power of a sanction-independent account of law will accordingly turn on just
how common Hart's puzzled man or Shapiro's compliance-inclined "Good
Citizen" actually is. And the widespread existence of coercion in real legal
83. HART, supra note 4, at 78; see also id. at 91 (insisting that a legal theory must "do justice to
the complexity of the facts").
84. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 69-78. Here Shapiro describes the "Good Citizen[s]" who "accept
that the duties imposed by the rules are separate and independent moral reasons to act." Id.
at 70. But whether there are "many," id. at 69, or even any, such Good Citizens, is precisely
the matter at issue if we are interested in describing the nature of law as it exists. As an
exercise in ideal theory, this question is of course beside the point, but Hart with his "fit the
facts" and "complexity of the facts" language, HART, supra note 4, at 78, 91, and Shapiro in
his discussion of the Good Citizen make clear that they are interested in capturing
something or even much that is important about our nonideal world.
8s. This appears to be the position in Joseph Raz, Can There Be a Theory of Law?, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 324 (Martin P. Golding
&William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
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systems suggests that Shapiro's mistake is not a philosophical but an empirical
one. If the Good Citizens are as rare as the widespread presence of coercion
suggests, or even if they are common but joined by large numbers of Not-So-
Good-Citizens as well, then an account of the character or nature of law that so
deliberately avoids its coercive character seems incomplete for just that reason.
That Shapiro appears to appreciate so much of this makes his resistance to
including sanctions in his account of the nature of law especially puzzling.
Toward the end of the book, Shapiro responds to the image represented by
Ronald Dworkin's Judge Hercules, 8 6 the judge "of superhuman intellectual
power and patience" used by Dworkin to demonstrate what "law as integrity"
would look like at its best."' In challenging Dworkin's Herculean picture of the
nature of law and judicial decisionmaking, Shapiro discusses trust and distrust
at some length."8 But he does so primarily in the service of arguing that trust
and, especially, distrust are important aspects of deciding whom to empower to
do what and, thus, are vital components of effective social planning. When we
have good reason to distrust people's abilities or motivations, as Shapiro
acknowledges that we often do, one remedy is refusing to empower or facilitate
them. But another, of course, is to punish people when they behave badly. Yes,
we do not hire convicted burglars to be bank security guards or child-molesters
to be babysitters, but convicted burglars who rob banks get sent back to prison,
as do people who abuse children while serving as babysitters. Similarly,
although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
frequently inspects workplaces because it does not trust employers to take the
steps necessary to maximize worker safety or compliance with OSHA
regulations, this distrust does not preclude sanctions, usually civil but
occasionally criminal, when employers violate the regulations - the legal
rules - that OSHA promulgates.
In light of Shapiro's recognition that the non-Herculean capacities of real
judges are a significant flaw in Dworkin's account, it is curious that Shapiro,
along with many jurisprudential compatriots, has so downplayed the
importance of coercion to law. But it is especially puzzling that Shapiro has
done so because coercion is so obviously a facilitator of social planning in a
nonideal world and because Shapiro has admirably recognized the role of
distrust and the nonideal in understanding law and the design of legal
institutions. We are left, then, in search of an explanation for why sanctions
86. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 238-413.
87. Id. at 239.
88. SHAPIRO, supra note lo, at 307-30 (criticizing Dworkin for failing to recognize the actual
abilities of legal interpreters).
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and coercion are excluded virtually entirely from the account of the nature of
law that dominates Shapiro's book.
IV.ON IGNORING COERCION: A DIAGNOSIS
Those unfamiliar with the norms of contemporary analytic legal
philosophy may be surprised to discover that coercion, which plays so large a
role in law as it is experienced, has so small a place in the philosophical study of
it. If coercion is such a substantial component of how law works and how
ordinary people understand law, then why is this dimension of actual legal
systems not part of an analysis purporting to explain the nature of law?
The answer to this question, which will not satisfy most of those to whom
it might occur to ask it, is that the prevailing norms of analytic legal philosophy
demand that an inquiry into the nature of law be a search for the necessary (or
essential9) features of law."o Properties that are not essential but merely
common or pervasive, however interesting or empirically important they might
be, are not considered part of the nature of the phenomenon that they are
contingently associated with, and, as it is sometimes put, not part of the
concept of that phenomenon. Hence, only those features or properties of law
without which it would not be law at all are understood to count as part of the
nature of law.9'
An appreciation of the jurisprudential task as limited to explaining the
essential features of law allows us to grasp the role that the rejection of Austin
plays in modern jurisprudence. Hart freely acknowledged that sanctions were a
significant part of actual legal systems," but nonetheless showed how a society
in which legal officials held the appropriate internal point of view with respect
to the rule of recognition would still have a legal system even without
sanctions. And he also demonstrated that the sanction-free parts of legal
systems -the power-conferring rules and the fact that the commander as well
89. At least in this Book Review, I treat "necessary" and "essential" as more or less synonymous.
See Brian H. Bix, Raz on Necessity, 22 LAw & PHIL. 537, 537 (2003).
go. See Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law, 29
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (2009); Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and
Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035 (2008); Joseph Raz, On the Nature of Law, 82 ARCHIV FOR
RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 1 (1996); Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the
Theory ofLaw: A Partial Comparison, 4 LEGAL THEORY 249, 255 (1998).
91. See, e.g., JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2001); Raz, supra note 85; Joseph
Raz, The Problem About the Nature ofLaw, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE
MORALITY OF LAw AND POLITICS 179 (1994); Bix, supra note 89.
92. HART, supra note 4, at 6.
61o
120:58 6 2010
THE BEST LAID PLANS
as the commanded is subject to law -are still components of the legal system
and parts of what produce legal obligation."
Shapiro adopts the same approach. Because his cooks are people of good
will and trust and because they are predisposed to follow the group's rules in
order to help the group achieve the common good, they do not need to be
coerced. They embody Hart's puzzled man and Shapiro's Good Citizen,
seeking only to know what the law requires of them so that they can conform
their behavior accordingly. So when Shapiro shows that even such a group
would develop secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication and
would create institutions of authority, he has shown that a legal system can
exist without sanctions, without coercion, and without incentives other than
the shared incentive to follow the law in order to make all better off. And if law
can thus exist without sanctions, then sanctions are not an essential part of
legality and not a component of the concept of law. The community of cooks is
fictional, but for Shapiro and others the search for the nature of legality is a
search for what is necessarily true of all possible legal systems in all possible
worlds. Because the community of cooks exemplifies a possible legal system
without coercion, the fictional community shows that coercion cannot be part
of the concept of law.
Hart and Shapiro connect their hypothetical analyses with the reality of
actual legal systems through empirical assertions about the presence of legal
subjects whose inclination to compliance does not need coercive
supplementation. For Hart it is the observation that the puzzled man is not
only a philosophical construct but also someone who exists in the real world."
In charging the Austinian picture of not "fitting the facts," Hart suggests that
his own picture of law more accurately portrays legal reality. And Shapiro is
even more explicit, insisting that many people follow the law solely because it
is the law."
But are these assertions correct? The question is an empirical one, but it
must be carefully specified. As numerous scholars have made clear, following
(or obeying) the law involves more than just behaving in conformity with it.,6
93. Id. at 26-76.
94. Id. at 40 (connecting the image of the "puzzled man" with "the diverse ways in which the
law is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court").
95. SHAPIRo, supra note lo, at 69-73.
96. See Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of "Obey": Further Thoughts on Raz
and Obedience to Law, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1990). For different versions of the
same general claim, see Joseph Raz, The Obligation To Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 139 (1984); and M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie
Obligation To Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973). It is worth noting that this framing of
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For most of us, our eagerness to avoid murdering our fellow citizens stems not
from the fact that such activity is illegal but simply from it being morally
wrong. Sanctions play no part in explaining why I do not murder my annoying
colleagues when they speak interminably at faculty meetings, but neither does
the law. Murder avoidance is typically simply an instance of people's
nonuniversal but arguably common willingness to do the right thing.
Once we understand that accidental conformity with law is different from
behaving in some way because of the law, the issue sharpens. Although law-
based and morality-based reasons may be additive under conditions of
uncertainty in a multiple-reason decisional environment,97 the clear case is one
in which someone would have done one thing (including doing nothing)
absent the law but in which the law requires something different. Hart,
Shapiro, and many others believe that under such conditions, and absent
sanctions, an appreciable number of citizens will relinquish their all-things-
except-the-law-considered judgment about what to do in favor of doing what
the law requires. And perhaps they are right. But that is an empirical question,
and the existence of numerous examples to the contrary," coupled with the
pervasiveness of sanctions, suggests that we need more evidence of the
the question presupposes a broadly positivistic perspective. If law's ability to obligate is
dependent upon its moral desirability, as it is under some (or even most) natural law
perspectives, then morality is doing the work in explaining obligation. We can conceive of
law as supporting content-independent reasons for action only if we have a content-
independent understanding of law-namely legal positivism. But whether law qua law
actually does provide such reasons is, as Hart persistently stressed, a moral question existing
outside of the notion of law itself. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617-21 (1958).
97. The phrase in the text is a bit of a mouthful, needing explanation and elaboration. It is
possible that some people at some times are unsure of what morality requires of them. They
may know that it is morally wrong to murder and steal but are less sure whether it is wrong
to drive while talking on a mobile phone, rob from a thief, or engage in statistically justified
job discrimination against the elderly. Under such circumstances, nonconclusive moral
reasons to refrain from the behavior may be added to the reasons supplied by illegality to
produce a stronger reason for refraining than existed absent the law. But whether and when
this is true, and for whom, and how often, are again empirical questions, just like the crisper
cases discussed in the text. (I thank Bobbie Spellman for continuously pressing me on this
point.)
9s. For a discussion of numerous examples, see Frederick Schauer, When and How (if at All)
Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769 (2010). Although the title of Tom
Tyler's Why People Obey the Law may suggest the contrary, Tyler's work is largely about the
circumstances under which people obey legal decisions that they think are correct in the
abstract but that happen to burden them personally. This question is undoubtedly
important, but it is a very different one from the question of how frequently people obey,
absent sanctions, legal mandates that they believe mistaken. See Tom R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw (rev. ed. 20o6).
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widespread existence of such people than has yet been provided before we
accept the claim that puzzled men and Good Citizens are all around us.
Under the view advanced by Joseph Raz, the empirical inquiry asks the
wrong question." Raz believes that we should be philosophically interested in
reasons that would appeal to the properly motivated agent even if such agents
are scarce on the ground, and, indeed, even if there are none at all. But this is
neither Hart's tack, considering his concern about theory fitting the facts, nor
Shapiro's. While not denying the philosophical nature of his enterprise,
Shapiro is plainly concerned with illuminating our understanding of law as it
actually exists.
This is not the place to determine whether Hart and Shapiro are correct in
supposing that law-inclined people exist in significant numbers or whether
instead such angelic citizens are scarcely more prevalent than real angels. After
all, the dispute is an empirical one, and we already suffer from a surfeit of
scholarship in which testable empirical hypotheses are evaluated by nothing
more than the intuitions of law professors and philosophers."oo But I press the
issue here to illustrate that the prevalence or rarity of the conceptual possibility
sketched by Shapiro's community of cooks is important not in determining the
value of ideal theory in philosophical inquiry but rather in understanding the
source and limitations of the norms that inhere in the current practice of
analytic legal philosophy. Because one of those norms gives pride of place to
explaining the essential features of the concept of law and consequently
relegates to lower jurisprudential status any inquiry that smacks of
jurisdiction-specific particular jurisprudence or conclusions contingent on
debatable empirical data, jurisprudential interest in the empirically contingent
and nonuniversal features of law tends to be minimal.
Because coercion in law is widespread but neither necessary nor universal,
its importance to modern jurisprudence has been demoted to a decidedly
inferior place. But this is odd. Consider, by way of analogy, the case of birds. If
we wish to identify the individually necessary and jointly sufficient properties
of birds-that which makes them birds-we will find only two: having a
backbone and having feathers. Birds are feathered vertebrates, and nothing can
be a bird if it lacks feathers or a backbone. Thus, having feathers and a
backbone are the necessary conditions of the category and the concept of birds;
but, perhaps surprisingly to some, the capacity for flight is not. Although
almost all birds can fly, and although having feathers is necessary for flight
g. Raz, supra note 85.
l00. Emphasizing this problem is a running theme in LEITER, supra note 29.
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among vertebrates that are not bats,' some feathered vertebrates -such as
penguins and ostriches, for example -cannot fly. And thus because flight is not
necessary for birdness, the capacity for flight is not part of the concept or
essential nature of birds.
Yet although flying is not an essential component of being a bird, surely we
miss something important about birds if we ignore the fact that almost all of
them can and do fly. It is true that penguins and ostriches and emus are birds
but do not fly and that bats fly but are not birds. Still, it seems of great interest
that almost all birds fly and almost all non-bird vertebrates do not.
Accordingly, if we were to consider why, how, and when birds fly, then we
would be likely to learn something of considerable practical and theoretical
value both about birds and about flying.
Birds are natural kinds, and although it is controversial whether there are
essential properties even for natural kinds,"o2 it is especially doubtful whether
an essentialist analysis is possible for artifacts and social kinds such as law.'o 3
But even if law did have essential properties, the question remains, as it does
for birds, whether properties that are widely and disproportionately
concentrated in some class or phenomenon can be of theoretical interest if they
are neither universal nor essential. And if the answer is "yes" for an interest in
flying on the part of ornithologists, then it seems that it should be "yes" for the
theoretical interest in coercion on the part of those who study jurisprudence.
1o. So-called flying squirrels and flying fish, as well as flying frogs, flying snakes, and flying
squid (really!), are all gliders and not fliers. Bats are the only non-birds that can actually fly.
The foregoing of course assumes a certain concept of flying, but analyzing the concept of
flying is plainly not my agenda here.
102. The loci classici for the view that the extensions of natural kind terms are not determined by
concepts representing necessary and sufficient properties are SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND
NECESSITY (1980); and HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of "Meaning, " in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE,
AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215 (1975). For the view that even natural kind terms
may not have unitary underlying characteristics, see John Dupr6, Natural Kinds and
Biological Taxa, 90 PHIL. REv. 66 (1981); and Joe LaPorte, Chemical Kind Term Reference and
the Discovery ofEssence, 30 Nous 112 (1996).
103. See Stephen P. Schwartz, General Terms and Mass Terms, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 274, 281 (Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley eds., 2006) (arguing
that "artifacts do not have underlying traits" and cannot "function like natural kind terms").
For application of that idea to law, see DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 52, at 3;
LEITER, supra note 29, at 268; and Brian H. Bix, Joseph Raz and Conceptual Analysis, AM.
PHIL. Ass'N NEWSL. ON PHIL. & L., Spring 2007, at 1. For empirical support for the view that
artifact categories are not stable, see Woo-kyoung Ahn, Why Are Diferent Features Centralfor
Natural Kinds and Artifacts?; The Role of Causal Status in Determining Feature Centrality, 69
COGNITION 135 (1998); and Steven A. Sloman & Barbara C. Malt, Artifacts Are Not Ascribed
Essences, Nor Are They Treated as Belonging to Kinds, 18 LANGUAGE & COGNITIVE PROCESSES
563 (2003).
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The foregoing seems hardly controversial. What could be wrong, after all,
with understanding jurisprudential inquiry as sufficiently catholic to allow the
philosophical examination of widespread characteristics of law that are neither
essential nor universal, including but not limited to coercion? But although
such a program of jurisprudential inclusiveness might seem unimpeachable,
the facts are otherwise. Raz, for example, writes that "[s]ociology of law
provides a wealth of detailed information and analysis of the functions of law
in some particular societies. Legal philosophy has to be content with those few
features which all legal systems necessarily possess."o' Similarly, Julie Dickson
argues that "analytical jurisprudence" is, by definition, general jurisprudence,
which is, by definition, about all possible legal systems.' And Jules Coleman
defines jurisprudence as being unconcerned with coercion and incentives,"o
thus suggesting that Austin and Bentham, for example, are not merely
mistaken in their jurisprudential theories and conclusions but are not even
doing jurisprudence at all.
Perhaps it is uncharitable to take such statements as attempts to exclude
Austin, Bentham, Dworkin, and others from jurisprudence entirely,"o7 but even
so, it is plain that the modern jurisprudential center of gravity is the goal of
explaining those features that are necessarily part of law wherever and
whenever it may exist. Most relevantly here, Shapiro unhesitatingly locates
himself close to this center of gravity. He is interested in the "properties law
necessarily possesses in virtue of being an instance of law and not a game,
social etiquette, religion or some other thing. ,,o And he is interested not only
in the properties that law necessarily possesses, but also in what necessarily
follows from the fact that something is law. 09 Shapiro emphasizes the
differences between the properties that something necessarily possesses by
virtue of being that thing and not something else, and the necessary
implications of something being what it is and not something else; but the
104. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 41, at 104-05.
105. JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY 17-25 (2001). For Dickson, this produces
the surprising conclusion that Ronald Dworkin, who unashamedly claims to be describing
advanced modern legal systems rather than all possible legal systems, see Ronald Dworkin,
Thirty Years On, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1655, 1677-81 (2002) (reviewing COLEMAN, supra note 8),
is simply not doing analytical jurisprudence at all. DICKSON, supra, at 22.
106. COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 72 n.12.
107. It is difficult, however, to imagine a more charitable reading of Raz's statement. See supra
text accompanying note 104.
io. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 9-10.
iog. Id. at 12.
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notion of necessity dominates both inquiries."o He is concerned with necessity
and not statistical tendencies, even overwhelming ones, and features that are
present in almost all but not all legal systems fail the test of necessity and are
excluded from Shapiro's purview. Like an ornithologist uninterested in flying,
Shapiro's interest in coercion and other nonessential properties of law is only
to show their conceptual irrelevance.
Contemporary analytic jurisprudence's focus on essential properties is
commonly defended on three interrelated grounds. The first is that without
specifying exactly what we are talking about we cannot even commence
examining or evaluating the interesting features of law."' If we wish to
understand law, whether empirically, philosophically, or normatively, we first
have to know what law is -just as we cannot talk about the various properties
of, say, toasters without being able to say just what a toaster is in the first place.
Second, a central question in jurisprudence is that of distinguishing law from
other prescriptive enterprises, such as morality and etiquette. Thus it is
necessary to locate the demarcation between morality and things that are in the
same neighborhood but importantly different."' Finally, the task of conceptual
analysis, of which the identification of essential properties is the principal
element, is an attempt to understand and explain just how we think and how
we understand the social institution of law."3
These claimed justifications for understanding (and, at times, defining"4 )
jurisprudence as the search for the essential (and important"s) features of law
whenever and wherever it may exist suffer from a common flaw: the
assumption that we need a precise demarcation, as opposed to a fuzzy
11o. For a more direct and sustained challenge to the value (and not merely to the exclusivity) of
engaging in such an effort to distinguish what follows from something being law as
opposed to other systems of normative guidance, see BRIAN LEITER, The Demarcation
Problem in jurisprudence: A New Case for Skepticism, in NEUTRALITY AND THE THEORY OF LAw
(forthcoming 2011).
ill. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 8, at 213-24; David Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal
Positivism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1984) (reviewing HART, supra note 40). For rebuttals, see
ROGER A. SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 4-9 (1992);
Andrew Halpin, Concepts, Terms, and Fields ofEnquiry, 4 LEGAL THEORY 187, 190-93 (1998);
and Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-naturalism/ (last revised Feb. 20, 2007).
112. This is the principal justification offered by Shapiro himself. SHAPIRO, supra note io, at 7-12.
113. See DICKSON, supra note 1o5, at 43 (arguing that we use the concept of law "to understand
our social world").
114. See supra notes 8, 104-109 and accompanying text.
115. That jurisprudence seeks to explain the properties of law that are both essential and
important is the principal theme of DICKSON, supra note 1o5.
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differentiation, in order to use and understand a concept. Philosophers indeed
debate whether Ludwig Wittgenstein and his circle, with their talk of family
resemblance,"6 of cluster concepts,"1 of contested concepts,"' and (like Hart)
of core and penumbral meanings," 9 were actually correct; 0 and it would be
misleading to suggest that Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin,' and others represent
contemporary mainstream philosophy. But although the view that our
concepts have fuzzy edges and often cannot be understood in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions - anti-essentialism' -has hardly swept the
board, neither has the opposing view. More importantly, the nonessentialist
view is consistent with a great deal of research in contemporary and not-so-
contemporary cognitive science.2 3 People simply do not think and use concepts
in terms of essences or necessary and sufficient conditions. Although the
1i6. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 66-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 2d ed. 1958).
117. John R. Searle, Proper Names, 67 MIND 166 (1958); see also MAX BLACK, CAVEATS AND
CRITIQUES: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN LANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND ART 177-79 (1975) (explaining
differences between cluster concepts and family resemblance).
118. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167
(1956).
11g. See Hart, supra note 96, at 607. For an exhaustive (or perhaps just exhausting) analysis, see
Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (20o8). It
is curious that Hart, who plainly accepted an anti-essentialist understanding of "vehicle,"
maintained that "[t]here are ... two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a legal system." HART, supra note 4, at 113.
120. One of the most prominent objections is in KRIPKE, supra note 102, at 71-97. For a response
by Searle, see JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 231-
61 (1983).
121. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). Family resemblance and cluster
ideas were associated more with Wittgenstein than with Austin, but Austin, based in Oxford
and not Cambridge, was Hart's friend and philosophical companion. See LACEY, supra note
7.
122. On anti-essentialism and fuzzy concepts, see Larry Laudan, The Demise of the Demarcation
Problem, in PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADOLF
GRONBAUM 111 (R.S. Cohen & L. Laudan eds., 1983); and Michael E. McCloskey & Sam
Glucksberg, Natural Categories: Well Defined or Fuzzy Sets?, 6 MEMORY & COGNITION 462
(1978).
123. See, e.g., EDOUARD MACHERY, DOING WITHOUT CONCEPTS (2009); Eleanor Rosch, Principles
of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B. Lloyd
eds., 1978); Ahn, supra note 103; Lance J. Rips, Necessity and Natural Categories, 127
PSYCHOL. BULL. 827 (2001); Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis, Family Resemblance: Studies
in the Internal Structure of Categories, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 573 (1975); Sloman & Malt,
supra note 103; Michael Strevens, The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories, 74 COGNITION 149
(2000).
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opposing view may serve philosophical purposes, it is not an accurate
rendering of how concepts and categories are used in ordinary life.
The existence of fuzzy or otherwise loose concepts thus provides an answer
to all three justifications for searching only for the essential properties of law.
Just as we can understand that "vehicle" has core and penumbral applications,
and just as we can understand that there is a useful distinction between night
and day even if we cannot specify the essential conditions for night and the
exact moment when night turns into day, so too can we use the concept of law
to differentiate (which is not the same as demarcate) law from other
prescriptive enterprises.1" And we can also use a loose concept of law to engage
in empirical or philosophical examination of numerous characteristics of law,
and to explain how people and cultures understand law and legality. There is
nothing incomprehensible about the idea of quasi-law, or law-in-some-
respects-but-not-all, or nonprototypical law, or failed law, 2 s and so on. The
search for the essential properties of law consequently not only rests on
controversial philosophical foundations and indefensible empirical ones, but
turns out also to be unnecessary to other jurisprudential tasks.
Because Hart (surprisingly, given his analysis of core and penumbral
aspects of the concept of a vehicle' 6 ), Shapiro, and many theorists in between
have thought it definitional of general jurisprudence to search for the essential
features of law and consequently to ignore important or statistically
predominant features that are not strictly essential, we can see why they have
thought it crucial to demonstrate that law can exist without coercion. No
matter how common it is for legal systems to coerce, and no matter how
prevalent coercion may be within particular legal systems, as long as there can
be (in theory if not in practice) a noncoercive legal system, coercion is not an
essential property of law. This explains the attention that Shapiro devotes to
his ideal community of well-intentioned cooks, because if he is successful in
124. For a claim about the differentiation of law from other normative and decisionmaking
institutions that is not dependent on a rigid demarcation, whether conceptual or otherwise,
see Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, go VA. L. REV. 1909 (2004). Indeed, it
would be a substantial error to take the difficulties in crisp demarcation to suggest the
absence of legal differentiation. Courts, the legal profession, law schools, bar examinations,
bar associations, the West Publishing Company, and The Yale Law journal, among others,
are all socially differentiated institutions premised on the noncongruity between law and
other prescriptive or decisionmaking institutions. Failing to attempt to explain this
differentiation is as misguided as assuming that the differentiation must be a crisp one
without fuzzy and shifting boundaries.
125. Cf Christopher Mag Uidhir, Failed Art and Failed-Art Theory, 88 AuSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 381
(2010).
126. Hart, supra note 96, at 6o6-o8.
618
120:58 6 2olo
THE BEST LAID PLANS
showing why and how they could create a legal system in which their good
intentions make coercion unnecessary, then he has succeeded in showing that
coercion is neither a necessary feature nor a necessary implication of law itself.
Shapiro succeeds in this task, but now we have a better appreciation of the
nature of the task at which he has succeeded. He has shown that noncoercive
legal systems can exist, but the value of his success is a function of the way in
which Shapiro and others have defined the jurisprudential enterprise.
Although the coercive aspect of law is overwhelmingly salient to numerous
people, Shapiro's comparative lack of interest in the coercive dimensions of law
does not stem from a denial that coercion is pervasive in law and important to
its actual operation. Shapiro does not even reject the importance of coercion in
making collective plans more effective. Rather, his decidedly lesser interest in
coercion (except to show that it is not a necessary property or implication of
law) is a function of how Shapiro understands the jurisprudential task, and the
looming question is whether his (and the contemporary) narrow definition of
jurisprudence impedes Shapiro from fully appreciating and developing his own
valuable ideas.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF COERCION
I have no desire to criticize Shapiro for not having written a different book
with a different aim. He has written an important book and, in showing how
the pervasive activity of social planning requires the institutions that we
associate with law, he has provided a novel and valuable addition to the
literature on why law exists, how it develops, and what allows it to flourish.
We are, as he persuasively demonstrates, planning creatures; but in order for
us to carry out and, indeed, even to make plans, we need the secondary rules
and structures of authority that mark the transition from prelegal to legal
society. In so effectively connecting the idea of planning and insights about
social coordination and cooperation with the insights and contributions of
jurisprudence in the positivist tradition, Shapiro has produced a work of
enduring significance.
It is precisely because of the book's value in connecting the idea of social
planning with the idea of law, however, that the limitations of contemporary
jurisprudential inquiry become so apparent. Because social planning is so
important, the enforcement of plans is not only the normal operation of legal
life, but also the expected-even if not necessary-implication of recognizing
the way in which plans are frustrating as well as empowering. If this
observation is sound, the difficulty with Shapiro's relative inattention to
coercion, enforcement, and sanctions is not that a better theory of law might
emerge from taking Austin's and Bentham's disreputable ideas more
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seriously -although it well might. Rather, the difficulty is that it impairs the
development of Shapiro's own important theory, a theory whose worth would
expand if allowed to flourish outside the boundaries of the constraining
jurisprudential environment in which it was developed.
It should come as little surprise that, historically, numerous theorists have
situated coercion at the center of their definitions and understandings of law. 127
One reason for this is that coercion is conducive to making plans, shared
intentions, and cooperative behavior more effective. But coercion also serves to
distinguish law from numerous other cooperative institutions that also have
primary and secondary rules. It is not implausible to talk about the law of
private clubs, nor is it silly to recognize that something law-like is in place in
universities, corporations, condominium boards, and vast numbers of other
complex nongovernmental institutions. And it is valuable to appreciate that
many features we commonly see in municipal legal systems are present in other
domains as well. Nevertheless, the central cases of law involve the law of
France or Ohio and not the rules of the Elks Club, and the way in which this
distinction has been traditionally captured is by thinking of municipal law as
attached to the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force."' That is why
generations of legal theorists have seen force as part of the central case of law,
even if they might recognize, persuaded by Hart and his successors, that
something quite law-like is theoretically possible without the application or
threat of force.
Perhaps Bentham, Austin, and other pre-Hart theorists were mistaken in
placing such importance on law's coercive dimension. But it is also possible
that much of contemporary analytic jurisprudence, which seems oddly to
127. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 19, at 260 (arguing that the "coercive force of law" has an
importance that "is not merely a matter of effectiveness"); E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW
OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 28 (1954) ("[L]aw may be
defined in these terms: A social norm is legal if its neglect or infraction is regularly met, in
threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual or group possessing the
socially recognized privilege of so acting." (emphasis omitted)); HANS KELSEN, The Law as a
Specific Social Technique, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF
SCIENCE 231, 235-44 (1957) (elaborating the view that law is a coercive order that
monopolizes the use of force); G.E.M. Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority of the State,
in AUTHORITY 142, 148 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990) (arguing that the "distinctive thing about
civil government [is] . . . actual or threatened violence"); see also HUNTINGTON CAIRNS,
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 277 (1949) (noting that Spinoza, Kant, and many
others conceived of law as "a form of social control" which had the aim of "ordering ...
human behavior through coercion"). Indeed, even Hart described a system of sanctions and
coercion as being, although logically only contingent, a "natural necessity" in any legal
system. HART, supra note 4, at 199.
128. See, e.g., HOEBEL, supra note 127.
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dichotomize the world of legal properties into the essential and the irrelevant,
is mistaken in the way in which it conceives its enterprise. By limiting itself to
the essential properties of law, contemporary jurisprudence marginalizes the
various dimensions of coercion and renders their examination difficult even
from a philosophical perspective. If jurisprudence and those who practice it
were to become less concerned with a conceptual essentialism that is itself open
to question,"' they might discover that the coercive dimensions of law provide
fruitful ground for jurisprudential and philosophical examination. And they
might also discover that Shapiro's valuable contributions in Legality become
even more valuable by connecting the idea of law as plans with the various
coercive devices and institutions that make planning most effective in the
nonideal world we inhabit. All too often Shapiro's book is trapped within a
jurisprudential milieu which slights the pervasiveness of coercion and
exaggerates the significance of the decidedly counterfactual possibility of
sanction-free law. If Shapiro's important ideas are allowed to escape this
constraint and can be recognized as a contribution that is partly philosophical,
partly sociological, and partly anthropological, then their value to the
theoretical understanding of law-to jurisprudence, in its appropriately
expansive sense -will be even greater.
129. See LEITER, supra note i1o; see also supra notes 122-123.
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